



Food and Agriculture Organization  
of the United Nations



# Rural Africa in motion

Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara



With the technical contribution of



**GovInn**  
Centre for the Study of  
Governance Innovation



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Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara

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# Foreword

This Atlas “Rural Africa in motion” is produced in a context where the challenges associated with large movements of refugees and migrants risk to mask the benefits of migration and its positive aspects. It is important to restate that migration is part of the development process and, as such, migrants have shaped the world we live in.

In 2015, the stock of people migrated across international borders reached 244 million. However, despite public perception, the largest share of migrants, about 763 million according to the latest estimates, move within their own countries, to cities or to other rural locations. Circular and seasonal migration are also typical features of migration facilitated by improved communication and transportation networks. In 2016, the number of forcibly displaced persons reached an all-time high figure of 66 million people worldwide. More than 5 million refugees were hosted in sub-Saharan African countries.

Around 15 percent of all international migrants are originating from Africa. By 2015, nearly 33 million Africans had migrated internationally, of which half within the continent. However, most of the migration in sub-Saharan Africa (75%) is taking place within Africa, in neighbouring countries or within the region, and is likely to remain as such in the future.

These migratory movements have been prompted by a complex and intertwined array of factors. People migrate to improve their livelihoods and in search of a better future. They move to escape poverty, food insecurity, lack of employment opportunities, as well as ethnic, gender and other forms of discrimination and marginalization. A growing number of forcibly displaced people leave their homes to flee conflicts, violence, persecution and human rights abuses. Climate change adds further complexities, as the combination of climate events and socio-economic factors are causing more and more people to leave agriculture and rural areas. But rural people also move for other reasons related to access to better and higher education, as well as other services, and often due to family matters.

Youth are particularly prone to migrate, in search of better opportunities and the fulfilment of their personal goals and aspirations. Youth in Africa are facing high under-employment and unemployment rates and many move away from rural areas because of the unattractiveness of low productivity agriculture. With around 20 million of people entering the labour market every year (of which 12 million in rural areas), the challenge for sub-Saharan Africa in the next decades is to generate enough employment to absorb its booming labour force. Therefore, any plan to tackle the challenges associated with migration must take into account its agricultural and rural dimensions. Agriculture and rural development must be an integral part of any response to large migratory movements.


Throughout history, migrants have fuelled human progress, sparked innovation, spread ideas and shaped the world we live in. Migrants contribute to the economic development of their origin, transit and destination countries, through knowledge, skills and technology transfers. In 2015, the total flow of international remittances received by sub-Saharan Africa alone was USD 32 billion, compared with USD 50 billion

of ODA payments. Investing a portion of these remittances in farm and non-farm activities can create a virtuous circle of employment creation and inclusive growth.

But nothing is automatic. The benefits of migration must be positively promoted through policies that jointly harness its potential and minimize its negative effects. In addition to programmes on agriculture and rural development, Early Warning and Early Action mechanisms, as well as social protection systems that are risk-informed and shock-responsive, can increase people's resilience and reinforce efforts to end protracted crises and sustain peace. Achieving the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development will help provide people with sustainable livelihood alternatives in rural areas, facilitate safe, regular and orderly migratory movements, and support migrants as agents of development.

The idea of this Atlas, resulting from the continued and fruitful collaboration between FAO and CIRAD, stems exactly from the need of new analytical tools that can improve our understanding of the complex and heterogeneous patterns and drivers of migration, helping us shape more coordinated and coherent actions. It aims at providing a stimulating overview on migration's dynamics and drivers in sub-Saharan Africa which will feed the policy debate between local stakeholders, governments and the international community.

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The completion of the Atlas has involved 20 authors whose list and affiliations are provided on page 57. The entire Atlas was coordinated by Sara Mercandalli and Bruno Losch (CIRAD, UMR Art-Dev, and GovInn, respectively at UP and UWC) with the continued support of Robin Bourgeois (CIRAD, UMR Art-Dev, and GovInn at UP).

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<http://governanceinnovation.org/>

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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
CIRAD	French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GBMD	Global Bilateral Migration Database
GovInn	Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation
Ha	Hectare
hab.	Habitant
HDSS	Health and Demographic Surveillance Systems
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPUMS	Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
ISA	Integrated Surveys on Agriculture
km <sup>2</sup>	Square Kilometer
LCU	Local Currency Unit
LSMS	Living Standards Measurement Surveys
MRHS	Migration and Remittances Households Surveys
MT	Metical
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
R	Rand
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SE Asia	South East Asia
SOFI	State of Food Insecurity
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
Thds	Thousands
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
US\$ or \$	Dollar of the United States of America
USA	The United States of America
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development







# Introduction

Rural migration and the new dynamics of structural transformation  
in sub-Saharan Africa



# RURAL MIGRATION AND THE NEW DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sara Mercandalli, Bruno Losch, Cristina Rapone, Robin Bourgeois & Clara Aida Khalil

## UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF MIGRATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has a long history of internal and international migration. In 2015, UNDESA estimated that about 33 million of Africans were living outside their country of nationality, representing 14% of international migrants worldwide. These numbers mask substantial differences between migration flows originating from North Africa and SSA. While in the first case the great majority of migrants cross the continental borders to reach Europe, people in SSA tend to move mostly to neighbouring countries or within the region. While African overseas migration makes the breaking news and generate heated discussions worldwide, yet a stubborn reality is that SSA migration mostly takes place within Africa and is likely to remain as such in the future. SSA is « in motion », but mainly within the limits of the continent.

In relative terms, migration rates in Africa remained stable around 2% over the last 20 years. However, the demographic transition in the region has resulted in an unprecedented growth of the population, with the absolute numbers of intra-African migrants reaching about 16 million in 2015. Official estimates neither include the significant unrecorded migration within the continent, nor its substantial internal and mostly rural-urban migration flows. Indeed, despite the size and the political relevance of internal migratory flows, estimated globally to be six times greater than international migration, accurate data and statistics are still quite limited. Although the common wisdom considers sedentariness of rural societies as the norm, empirical evidence tends to show that mobility is much more widespread than it is often assumed.

## MIGRATION IS PART OF THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

Migration is deeply embedded in the permanent process of change of every society. In world's history, and long before the general development of national states, migration between and across continents and regions has always been a critical component of structural transformation. The progressive shift of humankind from rural societies to cities has been fueled by a continuous process of rural-urban migration which progressively accelerated over the last two centuries and has spread worldwide.

In certain circumstances, migration is not a choice. It can result from the impossibility of people to sustain their livelihoods in the places where

they live, due to poverty, food insecurity, or adverse conditions related to environmental issues or conflicts (or, in the African past, colonial coercion). In these contexts of migration by necessity or forced migration, people may likely prefer to stay if they could. If not, they can decide to return home after some time away when this option exists.

But migration is more often a process where rural households try to adapt and manage risk, where they innovate, diversify their activities and livelihoods, and adopt new life styles. Migration can be temporary, permanent, or circular between different places. It can be selective and

### The data challenge

*Understanding the extent and nature of migration is a difficult objective because mobility is most often an obstacle to measurement and statistics. Information about migration dynamics in SSA is even more difficult due to the weaknesses of many national statistical systems: limited human and budget resources impact the availability and quality of data and its updating. In addition to estimated numbers of migrants, essential disaggregated data on migrants' characteristics (age, gender, rural or urban location, occupations and skills, working conditions and wages, and social protection) is very fragmented and unreliable at national, regional and international levels.*

*There is a major difference between data on international migration and data on domestic migration. For international migration, the United Nations Population Division is the major source of reference; it uses data from national censuses to estimate international migrant stocks. However, census-based data are often uneven in terms of content and quality, or lack questions about migration, particularly temporary migration. Also based on census data completed by national population register records, the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) managed by the World Bank has more recently increased the potential to assess long-term migration trends. The database contains bilateral migration population (observed stocks) for 50 SSA countries for each decade from 1960 to 2000.*

*Temporary and transit migration are not reported, which explains the lack of information about migration from SSA to North Africa. These two types of migration are partly included in informal migration data for which IOM provides a useful approach and information sources. Short-term (i.e. for less than 12 months) and seasonal migration remains difficult to capture. Similarly, labour migration as well as reliable estimates of the economically active migrant population at the regional level are still largely lacking - despite efforts and ongoing initiative by ILO to develop labour migration modules in censuses and to implement labor force surveys (Zimbabwe is the only country in SSA).*

only concern one household's member when the others continue to live and work at home, or involve the entire household.

Even if migration might be challenging, especially in the short run, it is potentially positive for migrants because it may open a space of opportunities, give access to new options, and facilitate their economic and social mobility. It can benefit both countries of origin and destination. At destination, migrants can act as agents of development and provide their labour force and skills. At origin, migration can reduce pressure over natural resources and foster more efficient allocation of rural la-

*Internal migration has received less attention. Even if some data is also available through censuses, with the same limitations, most of the information relies on case studies. Only a limited number of countries have developed specific surveys on migrant households and on the measurement of remittances. Overall research on internal migration relies on indirect sources, notably on household surveys which are not specifically designed to capture migration, like the Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) - implemented in 9 SSA countries for different years - or information from Health and Demographic Surveillance Systems (HDSS). The major constraint of these sources is the limited possibility for cross-country analysis due to non-standardized questions and methodology.*

*An attempt to conduct surveys specifically focused on migration-related issues led to the Migration and Remittances Households Surveys (MRHS) project, coordinated by the World Bank and implemented in between 2009 and 2010. Although very useful, this initiative involved only a limited number of sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and South Africa). Furthermore, in all the considered countries, MRHS have been performed only once, resulting in a dataset referring to a single point in time. The lack of panel data, allowing to build time series and study the evolution of migration dynamics and determinants over time, reduce the relevance of the collected information. Furthermore, the absence or scarcity of data on issues, such as circular migration and use of remittances for agricultural investments, limit the extent to which this data could be used to study the interrelations between migration and structural transformation in SSA. IPUMS-International or USAID's Demographic and Health Survey Program are other initiatives that try to harmonize and provide data on population from censuses or specific surveys worldwide.*

*A better understanding of migration flows in SSA, their patterns and characteristics, as well as the opportunities and challenges they represent would definitely need a coordinated and substantial effort of African countries and the international community to collect and analyse data on rural migration.*

bour. Diaspora organizations and return migrants can help rural areas through investments, skills and technology transfers, know-how and social networks. Remittances directly contribute to the diversification of income sources and risk mitigation. As such, they help to escape poverty and food insecurity. On both sides, migration contributes to the overall process of economic diversification and to social change.

## THE UNIQUE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

SSA's population is expected to increase by 1.4 billion by 2050 which is an unprecedented demographic push. Despite a strong urbanization process, SSA remains a rural continent. Its rural population keeps growing, resulting in a challenging densification of rural areas, with direct impacts on rural livelihoods. This unique population dynamic translates into a massive increase of the labour force. This represents both an opportunity for growth but also a challenge for SSA countries which will need a conducive economic and institutional environment to foster economic diversification, boost job creation and absorb new labour market entrants in the next decades.

However, a singular feature of SSA's economic transformation is that urbanization developed without industrialization. Cities' growth has been mostly supported by the expansion of informal activities which has resulted in limited increase of average income, and sometimes persistent poverty levels. A weak fiscal base limits the capacity of cities and governments to provide the necessary public goods at the required scale.

In this unique context, migration and rural migration in SSA cannot develop along the same lines as the historical pattern observed in other regions of the world, where a definitive rural-urban migration directly fed the transformation process. In today's globalized world, massive overseas migration will not play the same historical role than in Europe. Between 1850 and 1930, in a context of European political hegemony and through coercion, about 60 million European people emigrated to the "new worlds", facilitating European transition and the decline of poverty. As a result, the conditions of SSA's structural transformation are leading to renewed processes of change and new characteristics for migration.

## SSA'S RURAL MIGRATION IS SHAPING NEW LIVELIHOODS AND TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS

Fueled by this growing and still dominant rural population, SSA's rural migration activates different mechanisms. The adaptation of rural livelihoods to a changing environment includes the diversification of activities and an increased mobility, and rural migration is a core component of

new occupational and spatial dynamics. Despite regional differences, empirical evidence suggests that rural households are overwhelmingly engaged in agriculture, but most of them are also engaged in other activities, and 50 to 80% of them have at least one migrant member.

African migration has become a more complex process, with more categories of people in motion, going to a larger number of destinations, both within their own country and to other African countries, or moving in steps – first internally and then internationally. If rural-urban migration is a prominent feature related to urbanization, limited formal employment opportunities and a broad precarious informal sector in most African cities foster propensity for mobility, not just into towns, but also out of them. Rural-rural migration and important seasonal and circular migration – both internal and international – also significantly contribute to the distribution of the population and the reshaping of livelihoods.

In the last decades, renewed and diversified migration patterns have thrived between capital cities, small and regional towns, and their rural hinterlands, creating new functional spaces that are shaped by social and economic networks which can often cross national borders. These dynamics strengthen the territorial fabric of SSA countries and regional integration. They are also blurring boundaries between rural and urban areas. Rural-urban linkages, embedded within strong social, cultural and political dimensions are gaining a growing importance. The static and questionable "rural" and "urban" categories no longer capture the spatial and occupational complexity of rural and urban livelihoods.

## UNVEILING THE INTERPLAY OF COMPLEX DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

The decision to migrate is complex and influenced by a myriad of interlinked factors. Considering the role of rural migration in SSA's transformation process, it is crucial to unravel the mechanisms at play, and identify their drivers and their combination within the diversity of regional contexts.

Migration is often perceived as an erratic phenomenon largely driven by a desperate move to better-off cities in order to escape poverty, or by forced movement related to adverse local conditions. This perception, which partly reflects the traditional "push-pull" model of migration, is insufficient to fully capture the complexity of migration in contemporary Africa. It ignores the ambivalent and complex relationships between poverty and migration and misses the understanding of the agency of African migrants, even when they face enormous constraints. Overall, this vision fails to account for "non-economic" cultural and social or political factors, which play a decisive role in determining not only the direction

but also the characteristics of the migration flow (migrants' gender, age, education), as well as the type of movements. Many migrants are not only "driven" by effective labour demand, but also by perceived economic opportunities, educational or socio-cultural motivations. Migrants have diverse socio economic profiles and different expectations, responding to diverse opportunities according to economic, political and cultural circumstances—changing over time, sometimes under the influence of migration itself.

This calls for a more comprehensive approach considering the different socioeconomic, political, demographic, cultural and environmental dimensions of the drivers of migration and the time, geographical, and social scales they operate in. This perspective on complexity also invites to a conception where drivers of migration do not work in isolation to initiate or to shape the migration process. On the contrary, drivers of migration generally operate in combination, in what can be called "drivers complexes", which shape the specific form and structure of population movements.

### Blurred rural and urban categories

*Understanding rural migration as well as evolving population trends is complicated by the lack of an internationally agreed definition of rural areas. Although rural areas were historically the matrix of economic and social development and have always been at the centre of the development debate, they do not have a clear-cut definition: what is rural is what is not urban.*

*According to the UN Statistics Division, the rural population can be identified as a residual number after subtracting urban population from the total population. However, an additional difficulty is that cities do not have any standardised definition. The definition of urban areas varies broadly between countries. The main component is the size of population, with a threshold above which an agglomeration becomes urban. Other criteria are used, such as the percentage of households engaged in agriculture, administrative boundaries or service provision, and a mixed approach is sometimes adopted. This categorization issue has resulted in an ongoing debate on the right definition of rural areas, to which the FAO is contributing.*

*However, beyond the difficulty to set a standard definition, the idea that there is a clear division between an urban and a rural area misshapes the reality of what rural, urban, growing peri-urban and "rurban" areas are today. Remote rural areas still exist, particularly in SSA, but generally the improved access to ICTs, information, and to transportation networks, as well as better educational standards foster the movement of people, blurring the limits of the old rural – urban divide. Changing settlement, more integrated food systems, commuting and migration patterns and new lifestyles contribute to an interface where often population and activities cannot anymore be spatially categorised in a strict manner.*

## AN ATLAS ON PATTERNS, DYNAMICS, AND DRIVERS OF RURAL MIGRATION

This atlas on rural migration in sub-Saharan Africa adopts this comprehensive approach. Its primary focus is on intra-African migration, both within and between countries, and the very specific situation of internally displaced persons and refugees has not been specifically addressed. The first part of the atlas provides a global picture of migration dynamics, highlighting the contrasted patterns and diversity of migration in SSA and its different regions, as well as their potential for development, with a specific attention to rural-out migration. This part mostly relies on literature review and international databases completed by specific existing household surveys.

Drawing from a diversity of case studies, the second part aims to provide a better understanding of the importance of local conditions. Migration drivers and motivations are place-based and the diverse and multifaceted factors that shape sub-Saharan African migration dynamics reflect the diversity of the continent. In many countries and regions, rural migration is a complementary resource for households which are most of the time engaged in family farming. Their level of income is shaped by their farm assets, their productivity, their type of production and their connection to markets, as well as their environmental, economic and institutional conditions. It also depends on the diversification of their livelihoods linked to both their financial and social capital and the existing socio-economic opportunities. Therefore, the case studies highlight this diversity reflected in migration patterns and drivers.

In West Africa, migration dynamics are mostly concentrated in the sub-region. They reveal different systems which largely depend upon diaspora and forms of circulation that have directly contributed to maintaining the viability of local and regional economies. Parallel to strong migration overseas and in the region, Senegal has developed intense internal migration which provides answers to local constraints and the increasing difficulty of migration to Europe. In Zambia, back and forth movements of population between urban and rural areas have followed the dynamics of the mining industry over time. In South Africa, rural people migrate as a result of unemployment and poor social services. These migratory patterns are linked to a persistent rural-urban gap, rooted in the legacy of apartheid, which broke up local agriculture and economies. In Madagascar, rural migration is broadly oriented towards other rural areas. Migrants search for jobs and land, and struggle to open up new land frontiers.

The third part of the atlas illustrates the non-deterministic relation between a driver of migration and a migration pattern, highlighting the relevance of drivers complexes.

Migration patterns of rural families can deeply and quickly evolve over time as shown in the case of Mozambique. Shifting and relatively complex combinations of drivers are rooted locally and in the political economy of national and regional spaces. They are also linked to more global factors. Among them, climate change entertains a complex relationship with rural migration. Self-reinforcing, sometimes opposed, trends and unexpected disruptions are at play. Climatic events almost always combine with other natural, social, political, economic and technological factors, affecting population already vulnerable due to the fragility of their livelihoods.

What does the future hold now for rural migration in SSA? The complexity of the drivers of rural migration makes it impossible to predict how many people will migrate, why, who they will be, or where they will go. Yet, it is possible to explore how this complex system of interdependent forces could evolve, and to engage in proactive decisions and actions. Under the current international conditions and due to the economic, social, political and cultural characteristics of neighbouring Europe or Middle East, SSA rural migrants are unlikely to be in a favorable position to migrate out of Africa. The future nature of rural migration in the context of a booming rural population is one of the greatest challenge and uncertainty for the future prosperity of the continent. It calls for innovative strategies for agriculture and rural development, for harnessing the potential of migration for development, and for improving the skills and capacity of migrants in order to help them to become pro-active decision-makers.

## INFORMING STRATEGIES TO HARNESS MIGRATION INTO A DESIRABLE PROCESS OF RURAL TRANSFORMATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Disentangling this complex relationship is necessary but not sufficient for the design of adapted multi-faceted strategies in order to turn African migration dynamics into a development process of SSA.

The diverse migration patterns of rural individuals and families are responses to a diversity of constraints and contexts, and they are part of the structural transformation of SSA. They are all contributing to the reshaping of national and regional spaces and to the emergence of new functional territories. As such, they call for a necessary territorial approach in development strategies, avoiding the excessive sectorial segmentation of public policies and taking advantage of growing rural-urban relationships shaped by migration dynamics.

The spreads in this atlas offer elements of reflection about possible strategies, with the aim to inform public decision and action. They show that migration has been, is and will remain an evolving adaptive process of human agency. The complexity of rural migration calls for better policy

coherence between migration and sectoral policies. It calls for strategies for inclusive growth that create conditions to leave in peace and prosperity, by fostering rural-urban linkages, creating income generating opportunities and diversification to off-farm activities in rural areas, promoting investments in agriculture and rural development, increasing resilience of rural livelihoods, fostering climate change adaptation, and promoting territorial and integrated approaches to develop sustainable food systems. It also requires a political commitment to look at migration as an opportunity for the development of both countries of origin and destination and to promote a better management of migratory flows, through regular and safe migration channels.

Migrants can be agents of development and policies that harness this potential are of utmost importance. In the past, migration has been largely shaped by contingent factors and long term trends, but its future can fully be built by a commitment to make it the result of a choice not a necessity.

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
### Note:

*A selection of references is provided in annex for every spread (limited to five references) and for the introduction.*


*All the sources and documentation used for the figures are also presented in annex, as well as technical notes when needed.*




**Fig. 0.1: Frequency of criteria in the definition of «rural»**



**Fig. 0.2: African States and case studies**



**Fig. 0.3: The multifaceted drivers of rural migration**







# Contrasted patterns and diversity of African migration

SPREAD 1 A lastly booming rural population and the youth employment challenge

SPREAD 2 Prevalent, contrasted intra-African migration patterns and new territorial dynamics

SPREAD 3 Diversity of migrants' profiles

SPREAD 4 Harnessing diverse migrant remittance flows for development



**Population in sub-Saharan Africa continues to grow at an unprecedented scale. This will translate into a massive expansion of the labour force, which will account for two thirds of the global increase. Both urban and rural areas are affected but, due to a delayed and stabilized pace of urbanization, population in rural areas continues to grow steadily. This results in a challenging densification of rural areas, with direct impacts on rural livelihoods, increased mobility and diversification of activities.**

### A UNIQUE POPULATION DYNAMIC

Sub-Saharan Africa was the last region in the world to engage in its demographic transition and, unlike Asia, this transition is slower than was expected. While in Southern Africa and some coastal West African countries the number of children per woman has dropped to less than three, most of the other regions of the continent show slower and erratic declines. As a consequence, the United Nations' demographic projections are regularly revised upwards. Between the 2010 and the 2017 editions of the World Population Prospects, the estimated SSA population in 2050 was increased by 208 million people, with the region projected to reach 2.2 billion inhabitants.

This demographic growth represents a massive, unprecedented change in scale. While SSA's population increased by 645 million people between 1975 and 2015 (a similar change to that seen in India), it is set to increase by 2.2 times more (1.4 billion) over the same 40-year time period (between 2015 and 2055). It is a unique demographic feature in world history, which even China and India have never faced. In the meanwhile, the population of Europe and China is expected to decrease and India's population should only increase by 28%.

### A UNIQUE RURAL POPULATION GROWTH

SSA is also unique in the enduring importance of its rural population. While the world shifted to a slight majority of urban dwellers at the end of the 2000s and is urbanizing quickly, the region remains mainly rural due to the relatively recent urbanization process. It should only reach the rural/urban tipping point in the late 2030s. In 2015, an estimated 62 % of people were still living in rural areas.

Nevertheless, the urban population has increased tenfold since the 1960s and, as a consequence of booming megapolises, urbanization takes the headlines news. But, urban growth has stabilized at around 3.5–4% per year today, against 5% and more before the 1980s – a result of the limited structural transformation of most of the SSA economies. In

the meanwhile, rural population has grown at a slower pace (estimated at 1.7 %, with some countries still at 2.5 % and more). However, due to the importance of the rural population (602 million in 2015), a continuous densification of the rural space is taking place, with nearly 380 million additional rural residents being forecast by 2050. By 2050, the estimated SSA rural population is projected to be 980 million – a 63 % increase – reaching one third of the world's rural residents – and it will continue to grow well after the turn of the mid-century. Elsewhere, rural populations will keep declining, or start declining as in South Asia, from the 2030s.

### A MASSIVE LABOUR FORCE BULGE

As a consequence of this spectacular population growth, and due to the evolving age structure of the population, the labour force of the region is expected to surge by 813 million by 2050. This bulge will represent about two thirds of the expansion in the global labour force, while the number of workers will decrease in China and Europe. Based on the estimated distribution of the population between urban and rural areas, nearly 35 % of this bulge will be in rural areas, representing 280 million workers.

A change in the age structure, with a growing number of people appearing in the economically active group (aged 15 to 64 years), will progressively improve the ratio between working age and non-working age people. The region will be in a situation to reach its demographic dividend – i.e. the unique moment when the number of active people stands at its highest – which is a major advantage for growth as it reduces the weight of inactive people and releases a significant room for manoeuvre for investment in equipment, education and health, as well as for workers' income enhancement. However, a full positive structural impact of this anticipated improvement in the activity structure will depend on the development of a favourable economic and institutional environment (infrastructure, skills, innovation, and legal framework). If not, the demographic bonus (many workers) could turn into a demographic penalty (many jobless), and result in major social and political tensions.

The utmost challenge for SSA today and in the next decades is to generate enough employment in order to absorb its booming labour force. To better understand the magnitude of this challenge, one can consider the annual cohort of youth entering the working age group: in 2015, the estimated yearly cohort was nearly 20 million; this will reach about 30 million in 2030 and result in a total inflow of new working-age people of 378 million by that date – i.e. the current population of Canada and the United States, combined, in only 15 years. These numbers are not tentative estimates because these new “workers” have already been born (between 2000 and 2015). Based on the existing distribution of population and estimated trends in migration to cities, nearly 60 % of these new workers (about 220 million) are likely to be in rural areas.

### A GROWING PRESSURE ON AGRARIAN SYSTEMS

These population dynamics will place a huge pressure on rural economies. Due to their limited diversification and to the recurring importance of agriculture in activities and incomes, the evolution of the sector will be decisive and the possible pathways will depend on the pressure on natural resources and their management, as well as on technical and organizational innovations that would be facilitated by a conducive economic and institutional environment.

Growing demographic densities will be a challenge. SSA has for long been under-populated: the density in 1950 was 8.2 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> and it reached 44.3 in 2015. These averages mask huge differences between different regions and countries. Sparsely populated areas (adverse natural conditions or historic under-population) coexist with dense settlements (e.g. the East African highlands, the Sudanian zone, and export-oriented agriculture areas). As a mechanical consequence of the demographic push, the average SSA density should reach 100 hab./km<sup>2</sup> in 2050, with very critical country-specific situations (e.g. 1000 hab./km<sup>2</sup> in Burundi, 530 in Uganda, and 440 in Malawi). This means huge pressure on many local agrarian systems and raises the question of their viability. Tensions between uses (agriculture versus urbanisation or mining) and users of land and water will grow rapidly and will be sometimes exacerbated by the consequences of climate change. These will result in necessary new adaptive strategies, with more diversified livelihoods and multi-situated households using the opportunities of temporary and circular migration. However, depending on the context, when possible, many rural residents will also likely migrate permanently to other places. Devising adapted public policies, taking into account these new territorial realities and their possible futures, will be decisive in order to manage and facilitate this massive process of change.



Fig. 1.1: Rural population in 2015




Fig. 1.2: Estimated rural population in 2050  
(Representation proportional to population size)




Fig. 1.4: Estimated demographic changes in selected regions and countries






Fig. 1.3: Annual cohorts entering the working age group in SSA (1950-2050)

Fig. 1.5: Evolution of rural population in selected regions and countries



**In sub-Saharan Africa, domestic and international migration to African countries prevails over overseas migration. Due to the region's large rural population and the ongoing urbanization process, rural–urban migration is a prominent feature, although it actually coexists with renewed, diverse and contrasted other patterns, including rural–rural, urban–rural and circular migration. These migration dynamics reshape national and regional spaces, crafting new territorial dynamics.**

### INTRA-AFRICAN MIGRATION PREVAILS

In 2015, about 33 million Africans were living outside their home countries, although more than half of these international migrants moved within Africa. However, this figure masks sharp differences: while North Africans migrate overseas (90%), sub-Saharan Africans move mostly within Africa (nearly 75%), to neighbouring countries or within their region. Western and Eastern Africa are the most dynamic regions in terms of sending and receiving countries. With about 5.7 and 3.6 million intra-regional migrants in 2015 – 97% and 67%, respectively – they exemplify SSA's strong intra-regional dynamics, with leading hosting countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia. They also highlight the role of regional economic communities which adopted regulations facilitating the free movement of people, although the right to reside and work remains controlled. To a lesser extent, Western and Eastern Africa also send migrants to and receive migrants from other African regions.

These continental dynamics might even be stronger as international data neither include the significant intra-African unrecorded migration nor the dynamics of circular or non-residential migration between countries. If African migration is partly facilitated by free circulation regimes, it is also linked to the porous nature of borders that facilitates the movement of people and informal cross-border trade. Overall, the importance of circular migration results from the development over time of social and family networks supported by improved infrastructure and communication networks.

Further, the evidence from a diversity of countries, though limited, suggests that internal migration is very substantial and might even be the dominant migration pattern across SSA. It represents about 80% of migration in Nigeria and Uganda, 50% in Kenya and Senegal, and 38% in Burkina Faso, which has a specific historical relation with the bordering Côte d'Ivoire. This supports global estimates that consider the number of people moving internally as being six times greater than those who have emigrated.

### DIFFERENTIATED SIZE AND PATTERNS OF RURAL AND URBAN MIGRATION

In line with SSA still growing and dominant rural population, in the five selected countries, the majority of migrants originate from rural areas, particularly in Uganda (85%) and Burkina Faso (93%). Quite urbanised Nigeria is an exception with 55% of migrants coming from urban areas, while urban–urban migration ranges from 3% to 18% in the other countries. Further, the rural and urban migration patterns present quite contrasted features. Reflecting the urbanization process of the region, in all these countries but Burkina Faso (where the connection to Côte d'Ivoire prevails), rural migrants principally move to national cities. In Nigeria though, rural–urban internal migration is just behind dominant internal urban–urban flows. Regarding international migration, rural dwellers generally migrate to other African countries, either to rural or urban areas, as it is the case in Burkina Faso where rural migration is mostly directed to rural Côte d'Ivoire and its vibrant cocoa sector. By contrast, urban migrants move, overall, to other continents and urban areas.

Nevertheless, the scale of migration flows between rural and urban areas, as well as the widespread rapid urbanization across the region can be questioned. Census data based analyses show that, although some countries continue to urbanize very rapidly, urbanization pace has reduced. The explanation lies in the post-1980 structural adjustment programs that lessened the income gap between rural and urban areas that had been driving net rural–urban migration. Today, in the context of limited formal employment, broad precarious informal sector, and limited safety nets faced by most of the countries, important parts of urban livelihoods are also vulnerable and lack resilience. Such livelihood vulnerability has led to increased propensity for mobility, not just into towns, but out of them as well. Particularly, there are important indications of increasing circular migration, or reduced in-migration to cities. Livelihoods are not the only factor impacting circular migration. Rural–urban linkages in SSA are also embedded within strong social, cultural and political dimensions. Circular

migration tends to affect the net rate of in-migration to urban areas, explaining why SSA's urbanization is rising more slowly in some countries, with most of the growth coming from urban natural increase.

Rural–rural migration also contributes to population redistribution in many countries. In 2010, this flow constituted about 1/3 of the internal movements of people in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Rural–rural migration can arise when land access is possible and when new activities develop, such as in artisanal mining. They can reflect the extension of the agricultural frontier, and also be associated with crises and changes in environmental factors. However, most often, rural–rural migration results from limited employment opportunities in cities. Rural migration to other regions within the country or in neighbouring countries is often linked with the economics of important cash-crop production areas (e.g. cotton, groundnut, cocoa, coffee and also rice) that offer employment opportunities to a large number of workers.

### MIGRATION IS SHAPING NEW TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS

Overall, migration in Africa has become a more complex and diverse process. This migration creates new functional spaces that are shaped by social and economic networks. Renewed and diversified migration patterns have thrived over the last decades between capital cities, small and regional towns, and their rural hinterlands. These dynamics witness the blurring of limits between rural and urban spaces and livelihoods, and the growing importance of rural–urban linkages, thus portraying a new African rurality. The static “rural” and “urban” categories no longer capture the mixed lifestyles and socio-economic behaviours related to the intensifying rural–urban relations. However, public policies fail to recognize the spatial and occupational complexity of rural and urban livelihoods. Migration supports the diversification of households' livelihoods and access to employment opportunities, even when temporary. It strengthens the role of small towns and intermediate cities, as well as local and regional dynamics. This new territorial reality, shaped by migration, must be a matter of concern for public policies, which should facilitate a better match of policy actions with local needs.

Fig. 2.1: Rural and urban migration by destination (selected countries)






Fig. 2.2: Intra-Africa and overseas international migration (2015)



**Migrants' profiles are highly diversified and reflect the multiplicity of local conditions. Rural migrants' socioeconomic characteristics are not significantly different from those of other rural dwellers. Rural migrants are mostly young people with limited education and employable skills, and the majority of them come from households relying on agriculture. Widespread rural poverty explains why migration is generally motivated by economic reasons, although access to education and family grouping are other important factors.**

### THE ELUSIVE QUEST OF SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES

SSA is characterized by a vast diversity of migrants' and migrant households' profiles, and drawing a standardized categorization is neither possible nor recommended. Developing such an approach is also complicated by the limited data availability. Several reasons prevent any generalisation. Firstly, migration dynamics are context specific: migrants have different reasons for moving, reflecting diverse situations, opportunities and constraints shaped by local circumstances; and the overall country characteristics in terms of levels of poverty and welfare, economic diversification, and political and social climate count. Secondly, compared with other regions of the world, socioeconomic differences are generally limited in rural sub-Saharan Africa: migrant and non-migrant people and households' profiles are often quite similar. Their profiles are primarily determined by the characteristics of a region in terms of access to infrastructure and services, household sizes, assets, activities, and therefore incomes. Thirdly, rural national averages derived from the available household surveys tend to hide local differences and give a biased picture of the reality.

While, these factors call for improved data and a more thorough understanding of the local situations, they show that rural migrants are not so different from their local counterparts, and that diversity also exists within the migrant population. The major fundamental difference is simply that some rural dwellers decide to migrate, and others do not. The choice to migrate results from a combination of specific individual and family characteristics (networks, education, and assets), and/or is the result of individual preferences.

### THE GREAT MAJORITY OF RURAL MIGRANTS ARE YOUNG PEOPLE WITH LOW EDUCATION LEVELS

In 2015, among major areas of the world, Africa presented the highest proportion of young international migrants (aged 15-24) with 34 per cent of the total migrants. The median age of all African international migrants was 29. Looking more closely at a diverse group of SSA countries

(Senegal, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya), these trends are similar for internal migration. Young people predominantly move within their country and form the majority of rural migrants. Overall, around 60% of rural migrants are between 15 and 34 years old and female migrants are generally younger than their male counterparts.

The majority of migrants are males (from 60% to 80% in Eastern and Western Africa, respectively), which can partially be explained by specific social constraints affecting rural women. However, in West Africa, some young girls aged below 15 years migrate whereas boys rarely do, indicating frequent employment as housemaids. The region is also characterised by larger families (with often seven or more members) which are usually more prone to have migrants, reflecting the difficulties of youth to access and inherit agricultural land, which is an incentive for migration.

Rural people have lower school attainments than their urban counterparts, and rural migrants are no exception. Migrants tend, however, to spend more years in school than non-migrants do, as shown in Mali, Ghana, Ethiopia and Malawi. Differences in the education levels of between male and female migrants are highly irregular and dependent on the specific country context. It is worth stressing that the majority of rural migrants come from households that have better educated members. Between 60 and 80 % of them have at least one household member that attended school for more than 6 years. The percentage for non-migrant households is generally lower by 10 to 15 %. This difference in terms of additional human capital can facilitate the first step of the migration process thanks to greater knowledge and social networks. When looking at the employment status of rural migrants at their destination, it appears that the majority of those with limited or no formal education end up in self-employed jobs, while those that have reached above the secondary education level are more likely to access waged employment.

### MOST RURAL MIGRANTS COME FROM POOR FARM HOUSEHOLDS WHICH ARE SLIGHTLY BETTER OFF

Agriculture continues to be the mainstay of most rural dwellers in SSA. While the uptake of non-farm livelihood activities continues to surge in

most rural areas, the majority of households still earn their living from farm activities. This makes agricultural income the most important source of revenue for the majority of households, irrespectively to their migratory status. Remittances in cash and kind can play a significant role in terms of risk management. However, remittances are rarely higher than income derived from the main activity, especially when people are migrating to neighbouring countries, which provides limited returns. In the surveyed countries, the majority of rural households are operating on 3 hectares of land or less, with Mali being an exception due to the importance of large family farms, including several households and extended family labour. On average, migrant households have slightly larger farm sizes, indicating greater assets to support migration. At the same time, there is little difference between migrant and non-migrant households in terms of access to agricultural extension services or agricultural investments (notably irrigation systems, which are very limited).

The average daily income per person in rural areas remains very low. Around 60 % of household members earn less than US\$1 per day, with the exception of Nigeria, among the surveyed countries. In this context, earnings of households with migrants are slightly higher, with Mali displaying, on average, a quite under-differentiated situation due the limited amount of remittances sent from neighbouring countries (the situation is different in the few regions that have "specialised" in migration overseas). The share of migrant households earning more than US\$2 per day per capita is between 20 and 30 %—about 5 to 10 percentage points more than the case of non-migrant households. This validates the long-held view that migrant households tend to be better off. The slightly greater wealth of households with migrants is confirmed by their better access to infrastructure and services such as safe drinking water, sanitation and electricity. However, the differentiation between the two groups of households in terms of equipment is limited (e.g. housing, radio or motorcycle).

Because of this mixed picture where migrant households do not show a striking difference with non-migrant ones in terms of income levels, it is not surprising to ascertain the search for an improved economic situation as being the major reason for migration (up to 80% in Senegal and Burkina Faso, 50/60% in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya). The search for better income generating activities is a major motivation, and migrants hope first to improve their living conditions and those of their families. In addition, family reunification and access to education are also important reasons for migration.

Fig.3.1: Main reasons for migration (rural migrants, selected countries)




Fig.3.2: Characteristics of international migrants per country in 2015 (stock at mid-year)






Fig.3.3: Characteristics of rural migrants and migrant households (selected countries)


Average farm size per household type




Average daily income per capita per household type



Occupational status by educational attainment



Distribution by gender and age group





**Africa is on the move, but not predominately to Europe or any other continent, as commonly thought.**

**Migration patterns are diverse, both internally and internationally.**

**The dynamics in these patterns symptomize the socioeconomic value of migration.**

**Investing remittances and engaging the diaspora make harnessing migration for local and continental development an imperative.**

### DIVERSE MIGRATION PATTERNS

A key driver of domestic and international migration in Africa is the search for opportunities, particularly employment. Looking at very diverse countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Burkina Faso, within Africa migration prevails, first domestic migration, followed by migration to other African countries (which is the major pattern for Burkina Faso). This is consistent with literature on African migration and contradicts popular narratives of Africa as a continent on the move to Europe. Furthermore, consistent with conventional knowledge, people generally migrate from rural to urban areas where the promise of greater economic opportunities exists, though many move between rural areas too. Regarding overseas migration, the majority of migrants from these four countries originate from urban areas. Rural dwellers generally migrate to other African countries. These patterns of migration have socioeconomic implications for the migrants' sending countries and communities.

### DIVERSE SOURCES AND DESTINATIONS OF REMITTANCES

The most tangible developmental impact of migration involves the money that migrants send back home. However, Africa only received about \$63 billion (11%) in remittances out of about \$580 billion in total global remittances in 2015. Excluding North Africa, SSA only received about \$32 billion (6%) of the total – a figure to be compared with about \$69 billion received by India. Within Africa, total intra-continental remittances in 2015 were about \$11 billion, meaning that about \$52 billion (83%) in remittances came from outside Africa. Specifically, North African countries – with Egypt in first place – received more than half (59%) of the total remittance, followed by West Africa, where Nigeria was the major recipient. For intra-African remittances, most were intra-regional and West Africa received the highest share (79%).

In general, the value of remittances depends on the type of migration (long or short term) and, above all, the destination of migrants (domestic or international, and to high-income or middle- to low-income countries).

The importance of intra-Africa migration partly explains the limited value of transfers, when compared with other regions of the world. Out of 50 sub-Saharan Africa countries, 22 sent and 11 received more than 80% of remittances to and from other African countries.

However, the real numbers of intra-African remittances may be substantially higher, because many migrants are undocumented while others cannot afford or gain access to official sending channels, and thus remittances are often sent informally. Accordingly, in each of the four selected countries (and in Africa, generally) the amount of remittances did not proportionally match the number of migrants to other African countries and to other continents, respectively. Equally, African countries remit to other continents, predominantly from countries in North Africa and from South Africa (which sent 1.2 billion in 2015).

### AFRICA REMITS 'IN-KIND' TOO

Many African migrants remit 'in-kind' too – i.e. in the form of goods, not cash. These remittances are most often not captured by statistics. Besides money, Zimbabwean migrant teachers in South Africa, for instance, send food, clothes, electrical items, furniture and toiletries. This positively transforms the lives of families back home, alleviating poverty. In-kind remittances help increase recipients' disposable incomes and free up resources to pay for social services, transportation, agriculture and entrepreneurial activities.

This type of remittances is facilitated by geographical proximity and improved infrastructure. It is also fostered by the high costs of remitting cash, which force migrants to transfer goods or to use informal channels. Africa has high remittance transaction costs, despite the stable and reliable flows from internal and external sources. At 9.8%, the cost of sending remittances in Africa exceeds the global average (7.3%) and the 3% targeted in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In the four countries considered, although migrants in the main destination countries and domestic migrants both remitted in-kind, overall, between 20% and 35% of them were in-kind remitters at the aggregate level, with no strong

differences between internal and international migrants. For Nigeria, though, 56% of migrants residing in rural areas remitted in-kind in 2010.

### A STRONG POTENTIAL

Nationally, remittances might be macroeconomic stabilizers and sources of external finance, easing balance of payments-related challenges by boosting forex positions. Remittance-receiving countries could thus access international capital markets, and pay for imports.

However, remittances are private financial transfers to migrants' families or communities. They potentially help reduce poverty and improve household consumption by diversifying incomes, thus sustaining livelihoods. Recipients pay for social services (e.g. education and health). Parts of the remittances are sometimes invested in enterprises, construction of homes and agriculture – creating greater income security and opportunities for employment for households. However, remittances can generate problems too, depending on the specific circumstances under which such migration occurs, including the destination and selectivity of migration. They may disrupt traditional institutions and systems. They might also encourage dependency. Still, remittances help significantly to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods for many.

The developmental impact of migration and the potential to leverage remittances for development show that the African diaspora is an important development partner. Africa should harness migration by positively engaging its diaspora and key players in the remittances space, and by carefully investing diaspora resources. Africa should prioritize lowering remittance transfer costs and promoting competition, efficiency and transparency in the remittance market. African states should also reform their banking and financial systems to ease migrants' ability to remit through formal financial institutions. Indeed, remittance costs are declining, because of internet-based and mobile money-remitting technologies, although not fast enough, given the limited mobile penetration and use. Particularly, the development of banking facilities and services and mobile technologies should be extended to rural areas. This will encourage financial inclusion of rural poor, who account for about 60% of Africa's population, and help finance rural infrastructure and social development.



Fig. 4.1: Top recipients from the world (\$ billion, 2015)




Fig. 4.2: Top recipients from Africa (\$ billion, 2015)




Fig. 4.3: Main migration and in-kind remittances flows (2009-2010)





Fig. 4.4: Remittances within Africa (2015)





# 2



## Drivers of rural migration: spotlight on regional dynamics

SPREAD 5 West Africa: Lasting and fragile complementarities between agriculture and migration

SPREAD 6 Senegal: The fluidity of internal migration as an answer to local constraints

SPREAD 7 Zambia: Internal migration at the core of territorial dynamics

SPREAD 8 South Africa: Territorial imbalances but growing rural-urban linkages

SPREAD 9 Madagascar: Land and jobs as main drivers of rural migration



**In the face of population growth and the degradation of environmental conditions, internal and international migration is a complementary resource to family farming.**

**The migration systems in West Africa are intense and rooted in time.**

**Concentrated in the sub-region, they depend upon diaspora and forms of circulation that have shaped the migration patterns of rural people and contributed directly to maintaining the local and regional balance.**

### NEW CONSTRAINTS AND TENSIONS IN RURAL SPACES

The population of West Africa continues to grow at a sustained pace (2.7%/year between 2010 and 2015). In a region that remains mainly rural, with a few exceptions (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana), the impacts on rural spaces are direct. This is because agriculture is still prevalent while the natural environment is deteriorating under the impact of climate change and an already strong anthropogenic pressure. The areas most affected by the multiplication of extreme events (floods), the increase in temperatures or the decline and poor distribution of rainfall are the Sahelo-Sudanese region and coastal areas. The impacts on agriculture are amplified due to the weakness of infrastructure and risk management systems and the persistence of subsistence farming. The anticipated short- and long-term impacts of these changes on agriculture are all the more important as the most affected areas are those with high rural density.

Tensions associated with these demographic and environmental factors make it difficult for young rural people to integrate. These tensions contribute to the dynamics of regional migration with consequences that vary according to national situations. Some States have developed a dynamic urban economy with an agricultural model based on export crops and where the internal migration of rural populations is stabilised. By contrast, others have a less attractive urban fabric that is associated with a model based on family subsistence farming and a strong migratory intensity.

These tensions on resources which influence rural mobility is heightened by forms of instability and insecurity that currently affect the Sahelian space in particular because of the conflict in Mali since 2012 and the destabilisation caused by Boko Haram around Lake Chad. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are concentrated in the east of the Sahel/Sahara region; in 2017, Nigeria has hosted approximately 1.9 million refugees and IDPs and Niger about 300 000. Offered sanctuary in camps that are often on the periphery of cities or within local communities, these refugees and IDPs contribute to destabilising the local terroirs in terms of access to resources (pastures, water) and the occupation of land (controlled access).

### FOUR MAIN REGIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS

These constraints and tensions accumulate to increase rural mobility which are rooted in migration systems inherited from colonial history and encouraged by the new independent states. With the creation of ECOWAS ensuring the free movement of goods and people between the Member States, migration was facilitated from the middle of the 1970s, although the right to reside and work remains controlled.

Four main migratory systems structure the regional space and express the diversity of past and present rural mobility. They reflect the combinations of factors at work.

Concentrated in the Senegal River valley, the Senegal-Mali system is characterised by old rural migration. However, as early as the 1960s, this migration went beyond West African boundaries and changed their course towards Europe. Their consolidation and the investments by migrants were the accelerators of migration that impacted on rural villages and improved agricultural production systems. A diasporic system was consolidated playing a crucial role into the functioning of economies based on family farming.

The Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire system organises itself in the same way but focuses on rural-rural or rural-urban movements. In line with the colonial policy of labour displacement in the former Upper Volta region to the Ivorian coffee and cocoa plantations, this system led to the establishment of a diaspora of small-scale farmers from Burkina Faso that was accompanied by circular movements of seasonal labour. The Ivorian crisis in the 2000s led to restructuring due to thousands of Burkinabe returning to the urban and rural spaces of southern Burkina Faso without calling the system into question.

The Gulf of Guinea system structures the entire regional space through internal East-West movements and North-South movements with the other systems. These movements are stimulated by many urban pull factors. The major port cities offer rural migrants opportunities for rapid socio-economic integration that are facilitated by the presence of a large diaspora.

Organised around the Gulf of Guinea system, the Sahelian system encompasses the Sahel and Sudanese area. It is characterised by the continued existence of a model based on seasonal circular movements organised around family farming that mobilises labour only during the rainy season. When this labour is released during the dry season, it is employed in the urban spaces where it has access to the indispensable income required to alleviate food insecurity. This fragile system presents unequal access to mobility according to the production systems. Households that practice subsistence farming are confined to reduced internal and often short distance migration because of the required farm work. Households that depend on more diversified and remunerative production systems may release their work force during the dry season which enables them to access long distance migration to the cities in the Gulf of Guinea or North or Central Africa where they often join their diaspora members. The resources from migration (money or in kind transfers) increase and the departure of migrants reduces the pressure on local resources.

### A MODEL RUNNING OUT OF STEAM?

The regional balances that were gradually built on the resources from rural migration and those of the local economy are under threat today and the entire regional migration model could run out of steam in medium term. Demographic and land pressure and environmental degradation are limiting the access to local resources and increasing food insecurity. Conflicts and political instability impact on migration policies and are hindering and weakening the dynamics of the existing migration systems in the entire region.

Alternatives to migration to the cities exist but they remain marginal, much like artisanal mining whose rapid development attracts workers from the region without providing a lasting solution. Migration is taking place towards rural areas that are still sparsely populated in south-eastern Liberia or in eastern Guinea, for example. But they remain few as accessible land is rare and farming techniques are often rudimentary.

In the face of the growing demand for employment by young people in rural areas, pro-active and coordinated regional policies are necessary. They can draw on the social capital accumulated by the migration practices that have shaped the balance within the regional space; but they must also anticipate the current demographic readjustments as the region will experience a population increase of 460 million inhabitants by 2050.





Fig. 5.1: Modelling circular migration in the Sahel: the case of Tahoua (Niger)

Fig. 5.2: Inherited migration systems and rural migration dynamics



Since the late 1990s, internal migration in Senegal has significantly increased. Several factors contribute to add complexity, such as the combined impact of population growth and underemployment, the progressive degradation of the natural resources, and restrictions to international movements.

This trend of internal migration, which is the result of a broader structural crisis, is reshaping the national space, calling for a territorial redistribution around regional development hubs.

### THE LITTLE-KNOWN ASPECT OF SENEGALESE MIGRATION

Senegal has a strong tradition of migration that is essentially turned toward the African continent and Europe (respectively 45% each). Migratory levels between 2008 and 2013 indicate that the main regions of emigration abroad are Matam, Diourbel, Thiès and Saint-Louis, where this type of migration is historic. Since the 2000s, the geopolitical context has imposed tougher conditions of travel towards Europe (more stringent entry in the Schengen area since the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007), while socio-economic tensions at national level continue to heighten.

Indeed, with 13.5 million inhabitants (last census), Senegal retains a high population growth rate (2.7%/year) and its population is expected to double by 2035. 296,000 young people arrive every year on the labour market while the formal offer of employment is estimated at 30,000. Urbanisation is ongoing but marked by strong polarisation and a highly unequal distribution of people: the Dakar region is home to nearly one quarter of Senegal's population on 0.3% of its national territory. Despite this, the country remains mostly rural (55% in 2013) and the living conditions of rural people are deteriorating due to land pressure, the impacts of climate change (drought) and low and unstable income.

If departures abroad are widespread in the traditional regions of emigration, internal migration is playing an increasingly central role in the diversification strategies of households in the face of economic and natural risks and the deterioration of living conditions in rural areas. Thanks to improved communication (transport and mobile phone), rural people are moving and in permanent search for real or perceived opportunities for better income in the most dynamic urban or agricultural areas.

### YOUNG MIGRANTS IN SEARCH OF EMPLOYMENT

This mobility firstly concerns the age group of 15 to 34 years (almost 60% at the national level) but also young girls under 15 years of age who are employed as domestic workers in the city (nearly 13%

against 4% for young boys). The integration of young people in the agricultural sector consistently comes up against the power relations and weight of the elders. According to recent surveys in the Groundnut Basin, the Delta and the Niayes regions, 51% of young people who had migrated to an urban area did not possess any resource (land or livestock) in the locality of origin. This situation is even more pronounced for women (76%). Other investigations that also included the Casamance region show that migrants have generally achieved a level of basic education, with 40 to 60% of them having reached the secondary level. The search for work is overwhelmingly present and is the main motivation of migration (between 60% and 95% depending on the areas). However, the continuation of studies as well as apprenticeships is also a reason for leaving, in particular in the region of St Louis which benefits from wide educational offerings.

### GEOGRAPHICAL REORIENTATION AND GROWING COMPLEXITY OF MIGRATION FLOWS

In the past, migration that was essentially from rural to urban areas but also towards other rural areas, came from semi-arid regions (Middle Valley of the Senegal River, silvo-pastoral region of Ferlo) towards Dakar or the Groundnut Basin (seasonal migrants known as «navetanes», i.e. those who come during the rainy season to provide additional support in groundnut cultivation). Today, if internal migration has evolved and diversified in terms of the profiles of migrants, destination areas, and sectors of industry, cities still constitute the main destination of rural people. Firstly, the Dakar region but more generally the urban axis Dakar - Thiès - Touba (stronghold of the mouride brotherhood in the Diourbel region and second largest city in the country) polarises 60% of migration and represents 47% of the country's population (2013). The attractiveness of this megalopolis in the making structures the Senegalese territory. It stimulates specific activities such as the provision of domestic services from the region of Ziguinchor that is affected by isolation and security issues. It is also a learning opportunity for many rural youth (in particular from the Groundnut Basin) who then

seek employment in other agricultural regions. It is especially the engine of many circular short to medium migration that is facilitated by the size of the country and its road network, and marked by city-countryside return trips that enable the rural youth and their families to access activities and additional income.

Migratory urban-rural movements are also observed with the classic phenomenon of returning migrants who invest in the agricultural sector and/or who build in their villages of origin. However, the rural-rural type migration towards the new dynamic agricultural areas is the most remarkable. They illustrate the income diversification strategies of the rural youth who move from rain-fed production areas toward well equipped or irrigated areas, especially during the dry season. The two main destinations are the Delta region which is structured by the rice and tomato sectors, and the Niayes region, which represents the main horticultural production area. These agricultural territories show strong growth and have benefited from substantial public and private investments with many projects that aim to increase their productivity and stimulate the demand for agricultural workers. In addition to these two centres of attraction, migration linked to the system of transhumance still constitute a strategy used by the people of Ferlo to adapt to climatic vagaries. However, seasonal movements are increasingly taking place in the south-east towards eastern Senegal, in search for grazing areas and pastoral water points.

### MIGRATION AND TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURATION

These restructurations of the Senegalese territory linked to internal migration highlight the spatial imbalances; however, they also reveal the opportunities and the potential for a better use of local resources. To meet the youth employment challenge, a regional investment policy that structures the employment basins around investment in small towns and their agricultural hinterland would contribute to easing the tensions associated with the hypertrophy of Dakar, the megalopolis. The territorialisation of public policies, supported by Act III on decentralisation and whose operational phase is overdue, should contribute to find local responses to structural employment challenges of young people.



Fig. 6.1: A representation of spatial dynamics




Fig. 6.2: Destination of international migrants (2013)




Fig. 6.3: Characteristics of migrants in surveyed regions (2012)





Fig. 6.4: Migration flows between regions



**Zambia's current population and migration patterns are shaped by past trajectories. Up until the 1980s, an urbanization process occurred, due to a vibrant mining industry. During the 1990s, the crash in copper prices and the shutting down of mines induced reverse migration flows from urban to rural areas. From the 2000s, the emergence of new drivers, combined with the existence of strong social networks inherited from the previous mining dynamics, has contributed to the diversification of Zambian migration patterns.**

### URBANIZATION AND RE-RURALIZATION: THE MINING SECTOR DRIVER

At the end of the 19th century, the colonists showed little interest in Northern Rhodesia, which was used mainly as a source of labour for gold mines in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was only after the discovery of Zambian copper deposits in 1928 that these international migration trends were reversed and reoriented towards internal migration. The activity generated by the mines led to two types of migration to the Copperbelt province: internal rural migration, mostly from the present Luapula and Northern Provinces, and migration from neighbouring countries, where the first mines had already been in operation for nearly 40 years, with the related abundant labour force.

Until Zambia's independence in 1964, the labour force in the mines comprised mostly men who would come alone to the Copperbelt from around the country, leaving their spouses and children behind. They would periodically return to visit their families. This was mainly because there were movement restrictions during the colonial period to minimize staff turnover. The trend toward urban settlement grew after 1964 with the end of restrictions on family reunification, thus contributing to the emergence of a category of urban workers in growing mining towns such as Ndola and Kitwe. Hence, fifteen years after independence, Zambia was one of the most urbanized countries in SSA; thus, at least 40% of Zambians were living in urban area, compared with the average of 22% in SSA in 1980. However, the links with rural villages remained, and many miners resettled in their villages after retirement.

The falling international copper prices from 1973 onwards marked the beginning of a sharp slowdown in mining activity, which impacted on urban growth for thirty years. Decreasing incomes and the deterioration of public services related to structural adjustment policies made city life more difficult. From the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, there was a "re-ruralization" due the reversed. This was despite continued migration to the capital city – Lusaka – especially from the Eastern, Southern and Northern Provinces. Between 1990 and 2000, census data show net migration rates in favour

of rural areas (+28 per thousand in-migration for rural versus – 47 per thousand out-migration of urban areas). This process was supported by the Zambian government, which was aware of growing discontent, and it promoted a "back to land" movement, facilitated by the country's large land availability. This quite singular re-ruralization process explains the high rates of rural households with urban origins in the provinces near mining areas and cities (more than 40% in the Copperbelt, Lusaka, Northern and North-Western Provinces).

### NEW DRIVERS AND NEW PATTERNS

Despite the new mining boom of the mid-2000s, urban-to-rural migration has continued, supported by the strong development of the medium-scale farming sector. Nevertheless, the improving economic environment in Zambia has seen the urban-rural migration slowing down, while the rural-to-urban flow has resumed, resulting again in urban growth. The yearly urban growth rate was 4.2% between 2000 and 2010, compared with 1.5% for the period 1990–2000. During the same period, urban growth in the North-Western Province reached 8.3% per year, mainly due to the attractiveness of new mining activities in the Province.

During the same period, migration dynamics had been diversifying. The 2010 national census highlighted a new major migration trend from urban to urban areas (39% of all internal lifetime migrants), especially between Lusaka, Central and Copperbelt Provinces. These are the most urbanized areas in the country and are along the main railway line. Rural-urban migration (30% of all lifetime migrants) are becoming more complex due to the blurring rural-urban divide resulting from better infrastructure and communication networks, and therefore improved mobility. Based on the 2010 census, most of the rural-urban flows are for non-economic reasons; for example joining family members, getting married, attending higher education, and obtaining medical care. This is certainly facilitated by the strong rural-urban social networks woven during the urbanization/re-ruralization movement. Nowadays, schooling implies migration: for young rural dwellers, starting school at the village and continuing at board-

ing schools in cities is a common feature when parents can afford it. It is possibly a first step in a migratory process, which can then be consolidated by a first job in intermediate provincial towns, before a longer-term migration to the capital or other major cities.

In addition to the previous patterns, rural-rural migration also appeared in the 1990s, especially from the Western and Southern provinces to the Central and North-Western provinces. Successive droughts and animal diseases that decimated cattle were a major push factor, particularly in the Southern province between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. Looking like providing a pioneer front dynamic, the high land availability and good rains in the northern regions offered a strong incentive for many families from the Southern Province to resettle there, while keeping strong links with their relatives who remained behind. Based on the 2010 census, rural-rural flows represented 17% of national migration.

### CIRCULAR MIGRATION SUPPORTED BY SOCIAL NETWORKS

The higher mobility of people explains a rising renewed pattern: circular migration. This type of temporary migration, sometimes limited to a few months, is characterized by a return to the home place. It does not imply long distance movements as in most cases it remains intra-provincial.

This growing pattern results, on the one hand, from a somewhat lukewarm perception of urban opportunities and, on the other hand, from adverse climatic conditions and land scarcity which put pressure on agricultural activities and foster the search for additional incomes elsewhere.

People have become more flexible and look for quick options. This circular migration is facilitated by the strong urban-rural social networks inherited from the mining migration history and the improvement of infrastructure. Existing financial capital and social networks count; hence, the poorest rural households are likely to migrate.

The diversification of migration patterns since the 2000s has considerably contributed to increased population densities of some regional spaces, such as along the railway or the in the new mining areas. Whether definitive or temporary, this strong internal migration lead to a consideration of whether the territorial level is the relevant scale for designing and implementing public policies. Indeed, analysing local assets and specific constraints is a major avenue for identifying adequate development strategies, taking into account the potential of these migration dynamics.

Fig. 7.1: Evolution of urban population in Zambia and other SSA countries (1950- 2015)




Fig. 7.3: Rural migrant households and reason for migration, per province (2015)




Fig. 7.2: Lifetime net migration rate per district (2010)







Fig. 7.4: Migration dynamics from 1930s to present



**Post-apartheid rural migration is a response to a persistent rural-urban gap and poverty in rural areas. This gap is rooted in an agricultural economy that has left the overwhelming majority of the population behind. Unemployment and poor social services are major contributing factors of rural migration. A strong political will, taking advantage of growing rural-urban linkages and providing adequate public goods in rural areas, could support local dynamics and contribute to a more balanced territorial development.**

### MIGRATION DYNAMICS PRE- AND POST-1994

Prior to 1994, migration patterns in South Africa were characterized by temporary labour migration, with rural men, mostly Black Africans, providing their labour to the mining industry, mainly in the Transvaal, now Gauteng province. They left their families at home, because of restrictions on movement that were imposed by apartheid laws, with dire consequences on local development. With the end of restrictions of movement, post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a huge process of internal migration. Temporary migration continues and has now eased, but lifetime migration has also developed. In 2016, 9.2 million people were internal migrants (17% of total population). Only 15% of them (1.3 million) originated from rural areas. The interprovincial relocation of people has strongly reshaped South African geography, with Gauteng and the Western Cape provinces being the major recipients of migrants. Gauteng, the most populated province (around 25% of the total population) which locates the Johannesburg conurbation, hosts people from all over the country, while the Western Cape, with Cape Town, is the major destination for Eastern Cape migrants. The shares of residents born outside these two provinces are particularly high, at about 45% and 30%, respectively.

### A PERSISTENT RURAL-URBAN GAP

South Africa became a predominantly urban nation in the late 1980s and urbanization continues at a quick pace: the rural population decreased from 46% in 2001 to 36% in 2016. This trend results from the amplitude of South African imbalances that are rooted in apartheid times, characterized by huge wealth inequalities between race groups, and between urban and rural areas. Nearly 60% of the poor live in rural areas. This share remains stable and 69% of rural people are poor (2011), which is 2.2 times the ratio of poor urban dwellers (the situation has slightly deteriorated, compared with 2 in 2006).

Most of the densely populated districts of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the North West have high shares of rural population. They broadly correspond with the former “Bantustans”, and this is

where poverty is deeply anchored. Rural livelihoods still depend heavily on labour migration (often temporary), increasingly on social grants, and on a minimal and extremely low-return agriculture. This agriculture is the legacy of the discriminatory colonial Land Acts which resulted in nearly 90% of farm land being devoted to white commercial agriculture (progressively shifting today to corporate farm businesses). Despite progresses made in terms of infrastructure and services, many rural communities remain under-equipped (water, electricity, and good roads) and face very uneven access to services (health and education). Some districts still show a very significant level of people aged 20 and above with no schooling at all (12 out of the 52 districts of the country have between 15 and 25% of their adult population which never attended school). This adverse situation in rural areas explains a lower propensity and ability for long-term migration.

### THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS

In that context, unemployment particularly hits rural areas. Job deficits remain as one of the biggest dilemmas of South Africa. The country faces an extremely high unemployment rate, which reached 27.7% in mid-2017. When including discouraged people who have stopped looking for work, the rate increases to 36.6%, and the more rural districts of the country – in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal – experience rates well over 40%.

As a consequence, looking for a job or an income-generating activity is a major driver of rural migration towards rural towns or cities within the same province or in another province. Even when migration is temporary and gives access to a limited work opportunity, it can be decisive and prevent households from becoming trapped in chronic poverty. In 2016, access to work opportunity was the primary motivation in KwaZulu-Natal, the North West and Limpopo. However, at the aggregate level, family-related reasons comprise the primary driver of migration in rural areas (34%). It expresses both the increasing mobility of South Africans and family reunification, following a previous job-related migration.

The stories of individuals and whole families moving generally convey that sense of hope for rural dwellers about gaining better living condition in urban areas. Access to new social housing is the third reason for migration, but the search for improved livelihoods, which also includes better access to education, is embedded within the whole process of migration.

### YOUNG AND FEMALE MIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEW TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS

Some 40% of rural migrants are household heads, while 15% are spouses. Men constitute 52%, although the involvement of rural women is growing and this highlights their increasing participation in the labour market. However, they are more likely to migrate for temporary occupation and often within the same or in a nearby district (e.g. seasonal employment in the commercial farm sector).

The overwhelming majority of these migrants (80%) are in the economically active group (aged 15–64) and most of them are young adults (aged 20–29). At the national level, migrant households more often live in informal dwellings (22% compared with 13% for non-migrants), which is a clear indicator of poor living conditions and presents a strong driver for change. Education is a key indicator of the employability of a migrant and people who are more educated are more likely to migrate. About 56% of migrants have completed secondary education, including Grade 12, compared with 41% of non-migrants, while 8% of migrants have never attended school, compared with 16% of non-migrants. Therefore, migrants aged 15–64 have generally a better access to employment, even if access is limited most of the time to the informal sector. This is the case in every province, with the exception of Gauteng and the Western Cape, where the two major economic hubs offer broader opportunities for jobs.

In the new South Africa, migration has opened up opportunities for rural people who would have otherwise been permanently trapped in poverty. However, even when engaged in long-term migration, migrants remain connected to their rural settlements. They send remittances thereby contributing to rural livelihoods and they are part of social networks. These linkages facilitate the likelihood of return migration (notably with older migrants). Migrants increase the connection between rural and urban areas and between different provinces, and one of the major results of this growing mobility is the strengthening of spatial dynamics. Taking advantage of these new trends could present an opportunity for designing public policies that harness the potential of a more balanced territorial development and mitigate the growing costs of metropolization.



Fig. 8.1: An insight about South African territorial imbalances




Fig. 8.2: Migration dynamics (2006-2011)





Fig. 8.3: Main reasons for migration in 2016 (rural migrants)



In Madagascar, migration is mostly rural migration to other rural areas. They are driven by growing difficulties related to demographic densities and high levels of poverty. Migrants search for jobs and land, and struggle to open up new land frontiers. For spontaneous migration to be successful, a favourable environment is needed. This provides a major role to play by public policies, which can support a more balanced territorial development through the adequate provision of public goods and the improvement of land access conditions.

REBALANCING UNEVEN POPULATION THROUGH LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

The strong heterogeneity of regional demographic densities results in overpopulated areas with strong impacts on rural livelihoods, poverty levels and natural resources, on one side, and marginalized regions with limited infrastructure on the other side. These different polarities are both drivers of, and constraints against, migration.

Since the 1970s, several development projects launched by the government or NGOs have attempted to unlock these territorial unbalances and initiate organized migration. However, the focus was placed on land access only and did not pay enough attention to the conditions necessary to establish a community and to develop a farm. These projects failed notably due to the absence of job opportunities, solidarity networks, infrastructure, and public services, including the rule of law providing protection against armed robbery. However, during the same period of time, several spontaneous migration dynamics were active, spreading to other regions and developing new agricultural plots in forested areas.

These different past processes can inform public policies and help to identify ways for rebalancing territorial dynamics. The first is to supplement spontaneous migration with the adequate provision of public goods in remote areas (infrastructure and public services). This implies: (i) the implementation of a land policy framework, with new tools to secure land access to herders, and the need to stop considering that non-cultivated land is not owned; (ii) a reinvestment in strategic thinking about agricultural development models and the respective roles of corporate investment and family farming, which offer different opportunities with different impacts, notably on employment, depending on the local context; and (iii) the reengagement of participatory approaches, avoiding top-down practices, and supporting local stakeholders in the management of migration and agriculture development. The second way is to support rural development. Many young people want to stay in their own areas and they deserve decent living conditions. This implies secured land access, improvement and diversification of agricultural production systems (yields and crops), a diversification of rural activities (transformation of products), and access to services through investment in small towns and regional cities.

THE PREVALENCE OF RURAL-RURAL MIGRATION: THE SEARCH FOR LAND

In Madagascar, internal migration has been fostered since the beginning of the 20th century by political, religious, climatic and economic drivers. Whatever their forms – constrained, organized or spontaneous – they have contributed to the formation of national identity and human geography. Nowadays, and contrary to other African countries, this internal migration does not fuel a massive rural depopulation. Rural-to-urban migration has increased progressively, but internal migration remains essentially from rural to other rural areas. Urban growth mainly results from natural growth and from the administrative re-classification of municipalities from rural to urban.

Despite the existing reserves of arable land across the country, the average farm size is decreasing – a result of unbalanced population and demographic growth. By extrapolating the trends observed in the last two agricultural censuses (1984 and 2004), the average farm size could be expected to halve over a 40-year period, from 1.2 ha in 1984 to 0.61 ha in 2024. Where the population density is high (more than 100 hab/km²) and forests have already been cleared, land is fully occupied and subdivided to the extent that plots cannot be further divided for inheritances. In a 2011 survey of 1 860 households in 4 regions, 25% of youth that were born and farming locally did not inherit: they had no other option than to buy land, knowing that good quality land is expensive (notably for rice production). Land markets are active but segmented and embedded in family and neighbour networks. In rural areas, 83% of the households live on less than \$1.25 per day. Therefore, the only way to accumulate capital for investment is through seasonal or full time activities (in agriculture, charcoal production or mining) or/and to seek available and affordable land somewhere else.

MIGRATION AS A CHOICE OR A LAST RESORT?

Willingness to migrate differs according to location. For people from the South, migration is part of life's trajectories. Although a departure might

be triggered by a harsh climate, life conditions and frequent political instability are the main drivers for migration. Youth deliberately go to the western and northern forested areas of the country to look for jobs, clear the land and produce charcoal, and then negotiate land access with local communities. People generally leave when population density is high and farm sizes are collapsing. This is the case in the highlands (central regions) where people consider leaving their village as the last option.

Rural areas are most often preferred to cities because they are perceived as offering better job opportunities (e.g. daily work in rice transplanting and harvesting) than urban centres where the competition is tough. Because of the limited manufacturing sector, petty jobs in the informal sector are the rule (handlers, street sellers) and candidates are many: about 400 000 youth are attaining the working age every year. In that context, dynamic agricultural areas retain a strong attractiveness (such as Marovoay and Ambatondrazaka, in the Boeny and Alaotra Mangoro regions). However, when they migrate, people retain control of their small agricultural plots (if any) in their villages of origin. These plots can be farmed by family members, and they remain both an alternative and a way for maintaining social and identity links with the land of their ancestors.

Few areas remain with agricultural land reserves and potential for hosting numerous migrants. The well-known historical land frontiers (like the Alaotra lake basin) are now fully occupied and deforested. In these places, the oldest migrant families regard themselves as being natives there and have stopped sending the remains of their deceased back to their villages of origin for funerals. Land reserves which are likely to offer potential for a new agricultural frontier are limited (the Sofia and the Diana regions and areas to the east of the Amoron'i Mania or Matsiatra Ambony regions), and constitute probably less than 10 million hectares. These are remote areas with harsh and highly insecure environments (absence of public services, crime, and cattle theft). Few migrants desire, or are able, to settle new farms by their own in these large plains dedicated to extensive cattle farming. It is easier and more profitable to practise slash and burn activities closer to existing villages and public infrastructure.



Fig. 9.1: Characteristics of migrant households in surveyed regions (2011 – 2016)





Fig. 9.2: Population density (2012) and importance of migration




Fig. 9.3: Rural migration dynamics related to labour and land access



# 3



## Rural migration driven by complexity

SPREAD 10 Migration drivers complexes: An historical perspective

SPREAD 11 Climate change: A complex driver of rural migration

SPREAD 12 Unpredictable but manageable futures



The history of migration between rural South Mozambique and South Africa, from colonial times to independence and post-apartheid, shows how migration patterns of rural families deeply evolve over time. Shifting and relatively complex combinations of drivers, rooted in the regional political economy and a range of more local and social factors, result in a strong and sometimes very quick adaptation capacity of rural migrants. In the last 15 years, renewed migration drivers and patterns have resulted in a growing differentiation of rural livelihoods.

### CIRCULAR MINE MIGRATION UNDER COLONIAL RULE

The huge labour needs of the thriving South African mining sector led to a specific agreement being signed in 1897 between the Portuguese colonial power and the Transvaal government for the provision of workers. The bilateral cooperation system was improved in 1928 with a convention ensuring the provision of Mozambican labour in exchange for taxes and incomes for the workers, whose return to their place of origin was enforced after each contract. This policy, targeting rural men, established the South region as a labour reserve. In the 1940–1950s, about 1/3 of active males in Inhambane Province were in South African mines, and to a lesser extent, on plantations. With wages up to 300% higher than those offered by Portuguese companies and planters under the existing forced labour system (*xibalu*), workers' choice was obvious: it was a way to escape both *xibalu* and an exploitive *hut tax*.

Regular short-term circular migration between the main gold and coal mining areas (mostly in Transvaal state) and rural localities of south Mozambique was the dominant migration pattern. In places such as Leonzoane (Massinga District), it concerned 65% of men. A minor pattern was the migration of men under the *xibalu* system towards Mozambican cities and harbours (Maputo, Beira, Chimoio) for handling and railways construction, or agricultural labour (cotton, sugar).

With men spending more than 50% of their working lifetime in South Africa, this migration system translated into a deep restructuring of family labour and farm activities. It gave rise to prevalent 'peasant-miner' livelihoods in which men were engaged in low-wage labour, and women and children maintained a subsistence system at home.

### LONG-TERM MIGRATION IN THE TROUBLED EARLY INDEPENDENCE

The independence of Mozambique in 1975 radically changed power relations between the new Marxist-oriented government and the apartheid regime. This initiated a period of economic and military destabilization by

South Africa (and Rhodesia) that quickly shifted prior migration patterns.

First, South Africa cut labour migration enrolment to the mines: from 1975 to 1976, the recruitment of miners in south Mozambique dropped by about two-thirds. Second, in the early 1980s, new economic and military actions contributed to undermining the socialist project that relied on state-owned farms producing for export and domestic food needs. Foreign-backed attacks led to the destruction of main national infrastructure, as well as disruption of economic flows. Moreover, the development of the *Mozambican National Resistance* resulted in guerrilla activities that affected rural areas and prevented any regular agricultural production. When destabilization reached larger parts of the countryside from 1982, economy and agricultural production collapsed and about half of the country's population became dependent on external food relief. Exacerbating this situation, natural hazards (1982–1985 droughts) also affected food production.

Population movements within Mozambique increased. In 1984, people were fleeing violence. Gradually, over 1/3 of the population was forced to leave their land, move to cities or military-protected rural areas, or flee abroad as refugees. At the end of the war in 1992, an estimated 1 million Mozambicans had died, about 1.5 million had taken refuge abroad, and 4 to 5 million more had been internally displaced. These movements and families' choices were also strongly determined by existing kin and social networks, within Mozambique or in South Africa, where many mining migrants had stayed after independence. In Leonzoane, 82% of the people had left, either to Massinga, Maputo or South Africa, helped by their networks, but leaving their land and possessions behind.

In this troubled context, new migration patterns emerged. Long term domestic migration increased as a consequence of limitations of displacements due to war. In Leonzoane, 70% of households just moved once within Mozambique or to South Africa, with rare home returns; others did a two-step migration, within the country and then to South Africa, with no return, at least until the end of the war. Local livelihoods were further impacted upon, with a lesser contribution of males to agriculture and a growing role for the informal sector.

### DIVERSIFIED CIRCULAR MIGRATION LED BY LIBERALIZATION AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

With the end of warfare (1992) and apartheid (1994), new drivers reshaped migration. Economic growth in democratic South Africa did not provide enough jobs for the black low-skilled labour force. High unemployment and the development of poorly paid and informal jobs directly impacted upon migrants from rural Mozambique, since they were likely to compete with unemployed local workers. Foreign miners, hit by large job losses in the 1990s, had no choice but to enter sub-contracting, casualization and undocumented labour.

In Mozambique, the government had turned to a market-oriented economy. The new economic growth occurred with strong inequalities, rising rural poverty, and the broad family farming sector lacking the needed support. Migration remained an option for many, but mostly towards the South African informal economy. Despite South Africa's new immigration laws offering migrants more rights, authorities clearly discouraged permanent immigration and the result was an increase of undocumented migrants.

With peace, people were able to move again – helped by improved infrastructure and communication. Refugees who decided to stay in South Africa or in Mozambican cities have been consolidating social networks with their relatives in rural areas. Stronger and more complex linkages between places and people led to the expansion of new migration patterns toward a diversity of circular movements. Two-step migration patterns, national and then international, with home returns or short term visits, have developed. These profiles are the more mobile and reflect multi-sites, with shifting residences. The numbers of long-term national or international migration has also increased. This comes with new routes towards locations within the traditional mining areas and outside (in the Eastern and Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal).

These renewed patterns of migration are reshaping rural livelihoods as part of adaptation strategies to a liberalized context where informal and volatile labour conditions prevail. They result in increasing livelihoods' differentiation in terms of income and activities, between migrants and non-migrant households – being the poorest – and between migrants.

This multilevel, unsteady and complex nature of drivers of rural migration, as well as the development of circular migration in Southern Africa and their significant contribution to rural livelihoods, call for their consideration as a transversal issue in national development policies. It also requires adapted regional migration governance structures to take advantage of the development potential of migration for the region.

Fig.10.1: Diversity of migration patterns and household livelihoods: trajectories from Massinga district (1992-2010)




Fig.10.2: Shifting migration patterns from Inhambane province (1897-2010)





Fig.10.3: Type of support provided to migrants by kinship or social networks (Massinga district)



**The link between climate change and rural migration is complex. Several entangled, often self-reinforcing factors are at play. The combination of climatic events and other natural, social, political and economic factors affect populations living in already vulnerable and fragile environments. Understanding how climate change interacts with other migration drivers requires disentangling this complexity in order to design adaptation strategies that address the root causes of vulnerability and tackle the challenges of climate related migration.**

### CLIMATE CHANGE: A MULTI-FACETED FACTOR

Climate change is a global phenomenon whose widespread impacts are becoming increasingly disruptive to human and natural systems. Climatic events vary in nature, intensity and frequency. Sudden hazards, including floods, can cause immediate - even if often temporary - relocation of people moving out from devastated areas. Extreme slow onset events such as droughts may trigger slower but steadier forms of migration, as shown in the 1970s in the Sahel region. Evidence shows that communities have traditionally coped with, and adapted to, adverse environments. Rural populations have always displayed an extraordinary capacity of innovation, as illustrated by the patient shaping of many agricultural landscapes around the world, such as oasis agricultural systems or terrace cultivation. Migration has long been part of these adaptation processes and is a livelihoods and risk diversification strategy. Pastoralists in arid and semi-arid regions have developed mobility strategies to cope with climate variability and reduce pressure on natural resources.

The magnitude of the effects of climate change is posing now unprecedented challenges and shaping migration patterns. The climate change-migration relationship is far from being based on linear causality. Although environmental changes can influence migration, the decision to migrate is mediated by social, economic and political structures as well as cognitive factors such as place attachment. The outcomes of these interactions are profoundly heterogeneous and can stimulate different responses, including immobility when climate hazards affect access to assets and resources that are fundamental for migration. Migration has been increasingly seen as an adaptive response to the impacts of climate change, operating as a buffer and contributing to the resilience of the communities of origin.

### HITTING PARTICULARLY TROPICAL AREAS

Tropical regions, and most notably SSA are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts. This vulnerability results from certain local specificities,

such as the extensive reliance on rainfed crop production that represents 96% of agricultural land in SSA, albeit with limited economic and institutional capacity to adapt to climate change.

Temperatures and rainfall changes can have severe impacts on livelihoods, shortening the time for crop maturity, increasing water stress and affecting flowering and seed set. Some quantitative studies indicate that tropical regions will experience wheat and maize crop losses as a consequence of even small changes in temperatures. Crop losses for major cereals are estimated at around 20% by 2050 if no action is taken to mitigate the effect of climate change. Regions that are highly sensitive to temperature changes such as the Sudanian region (Southern Senegal, Southern Mali and Burkina Faso) are expected to experience higher yield reductions than regions which are more sensitive to rainfall changes such as the Sahel (Niger, Central Mali, Northern Senegal and Burkina Faso).

Climate change can foster food insecurity. SSA is one of the regions that would be the most severely hit, with scenarios projecting a 20% increase of malnutrition incidence in 2050. Food crises will likely result from a succession of shocks rather than isolated events and from coupling climatic and non-climatic factors. Forecasting rural migration patterns based on climate projections is indeed inaccurate and overlooks the complexity.

### HITTING THE MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE AND PLACES

The climate change-migration relationship is not only related to the exposure of populations to climatic hazards and shocks but also to their sensitivity and capacity to adapt to such events. Exposure to climatic hazards, dependency on climate sensitive livelihood activities (i.e. rainfed agriculture) and low capacities and opportunities to adapt are some of the compounded elements that shape vulnerability, hence migration drivers and outcomes.

In SSA, rural communities still heavily depend on climate sensitive livelihood activities because of the remaining importance of extractive activities (hunting, fishing, and gathering), and on agriculture for rural in-

comes (sales of products and self-consumption of food, water, and energy - wood and charcoal). The slow development of irrigation supplies, the low adaptive capacity of existing farming systems, and the limited institutional capacity to design and implement effective adaptation measures exacerbate the overreliance on natural factors. Moreover, the majority of rural people are poor; many are in extreme poverty, and their ability to cope with external shocks is limited by scarce or non-existent possibilities for savings. While kinship and social networks could facilitate adaptation strategies - including migration - other factors such as low levels of education or limited access to assets and resources can act as barriers. Some regions of the continent are already facing critical environmental crises. These are places where land pressure is high (like the Ethiopian Highlands or the Great Lakes region) and where the vulnerability is also exacerbated by water shortages (e.g. Northern Nigeria, specific areas of Central Mali and Burkina Faso).

### HITTING FRAGILE INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

Climate change affect people differently depending on their existing vulnerability and capacities to respond to its impacts. In countries where risk mitigation mechanisms are in place, people can be better equipped to prepare and cope with the adverse impacts of climate change. The adequate provision of private insurance and public goods (civil protection) and the governments' capacity to answer to basic needs in the aftermath of natural disasters could, for instance, allow people to reconstruct their livelihoods and release pressure on the need to migrate. Similarly, preventive measures aiming at strengthening livelihoods resilience and reducing their sensitivity to climate variability could provide opportunities for people to thrive. Interventions to tackle the root causes of vulnerability spanning from building climate resilient infrastructures to boosting education and access to information could serve the double purpose of decreasing vulnerability as well as enhancing the positive impacts of migration for resilience building. In most SSA countries, issues such as political instability, bad governance, lack of capacities and limited financial resources prevent an effective use and implementation of similar mechanisms. Prevention and adaptation require development strategies based on collective choices, grounded in possible and desirable visions of the future and possible scenarios. It calls for participatory processes for adequate and efficient design of public policies and implementation of multi-stakeholder actions.



Fig.11.3: Aridity zones in 2005




Fig.11.2: Levels of soil degradation in Africa in 2005




Fig.11.1: Population density in 2010




Fig.11.4: Working population engaged in agriculture in 2013




Fig.11.5: Distribution of poverty in 2013






Fig.11.6: Levels of vulnerability (early 21<sup>st</sup> century)



The complexity of the drivers of rural migration in SSA makes it impossible to predict how many people will migrate, why, who they will be, or where they will go. Yet, it is possible to explore how this complex system of interdependent forces could evolve, and to engage in proactive decisions and actions. SSA rural migrants are unlikely to be in a favorable position to migrate out of Africa. This poses a great challenge for the future prosperity of the continent: migration by necessity or by choice?

### LONG-TERM, CLIMATE-RELATED MIGRATION PATTERNS

Climatic conditions are acknowledged as constituting a major driver of rural outmigration from SSA, because agriculture is a very weather-sensitive activity and will remain a crucial source of livelihood support and employment. A long-term (50 years and beyond) deleterious effect of climate change arises from temperature increase. Anticipated effects of climate change could trigger different and simultaneous patterns of migration. The first pattern is moving towards the poles. In Africa, it would mean more migration towards South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. The second pattern, moving towards the coasts, would mean migration towards coastal Western and Eastern Africa and the southern coast. And the third pattern, moving towards cooler central areas, would concern the plateaus and highlands of the Great Lakes region, Ethiopia and Southern Africa. These patterns will interact as migration towards already crowded coastal areas or areas affected by rising sea level could trigger a back-flow towards central areas. These large movements of population would originate from rural areas where rises in temperature would adversely affect natural resources and the suitability of the natural environment for agriculture. They will be colliding also with the effect of other trends, like decreasing rainfall in Southern Africa. In the nearer future (10 to 20 years), climate variability, particularly the frequency and intensity of hazards such as droughts and floods, will play a more important role regarding how climate might affect migration.

### MIGRATING WITHIN AFRICA UNDER DIFFERENT WORLD ORDERS

Rural migrants have three potential destinations: rural or urban areas in the same or another African country, or countries overseas. From a future-oriented perspective, the third one will be problematic as the SSA rural population would compete with other internationally migrating populations. Three typical world orders, commonly found in futures studies, can be used to describe this situation. One called “Continued growth” is the pursuit of current trends with economic growth being the driver of

development and the only pathway; one called “Collapse” displays economic, environmental, resource, moral, or ideological breakdowns, leading to a significantly lower level of wellbeing and growing tensions; and one called “Discipline” refocuses the economy and society on attaining fair distribution of wealth and cooperation. None of these scenarios provides a favorable context for international migration overseas from rural SSA, although this does not mean that attempts to migrate from there will stop. The “Continued growth” scenario would favor international migration of highly educated and skilled migrants who are valued for their manufacturing and service sector skills, which are not those possessed by rural people. Migration policies in destination countries will also deter rural migrants from SSA. In the “Collapse” scenario, the flows of migrants from Asia will outnumber SSA rural migrants. A “Collapse” scenario world is also unlikely to welcome large numbers of migrants. In the “Discipline” scenario, the divide between rural and urban, and developing and developed, areas is decreasing. The push-and-pull system would disappear and rural out-migration from SSA would be limited, based on individual choices and aspirations.

The bulk of rural migration will thus take place within Africa and could affect existing national boundaries. Its intensity and direction will be triggered, maintained and oriented by the interplay of convergent and divergent economic, political, social, environmental and technological factors. Climate change will affect water availability, soil quality and access to energy. The capacity of local farming systems for coping with climatic hazards and for providing employment, especially to the growing number of youth entering the labour market, increasing income and improving the use of natural resources is crucial. Rural populations that depend on ecosystems under growing stress, without palliative technological perspectives, will be under pressure to move out. Youth will represent the largest share because of their numbers, because their livelihoods need to be fostered – through inheritance or acquisition of production factors – and because they aspire to attain lifestyles that they cannot find locally. Local food insecurity, political instability, conflict and violence would combine with a socioeconomic environment that would encourage

migration through rural and urban income per capita divides, failing local job markets for young people, or social constraints for youth and women. Ultimately, individual capabilities will determine who, and how many, among rural people will migrate. Existing intra-Africa social networks and diaspora, linguistic or cultural bonds will play a growing role regarding potential destinations for these migrants.

### CHOICE OR NECESSITY? A PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH TO MIGRATION

A complex geography of migration in SSA is thus emerging. Crucial variables include the size of the rural population, the location and occurrence of extreme weather events (droughts and floods) and slow-onsets, the level of poverty and food insecurity, access to decent job opportunities, the quality of governance, and the attractiveness of human habitats. Rural migrants will go to African rural or urban “safe havens” that provide peace, stability, decent lives and livelihoods. It is impossible to predict where exactly these places will be found, but we can anticipate what could happen and act in consequence. There is a risk of a massive convergence of migration flows towards a limited number of “safe havens”. Once their maximum absorption capacity is exceeded, their social receptivity to migrants will fade, leading to conflicts that will threaten their existence, turning them into hostile places. More migrants would be forced to move and look for other options, returning to their places of origin or moving to less-populated areas with possibly limited opportunities and harsher natural conditions.

The futures of rural migration in SSA are shaped by combined trends and disruptions, which can be pro-actively managed to orient the future shape of human settlements. Options include a concerted approach to intra-African migration at national and regional levels facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration channels, the development of sustainable large cities, a stronger investment in intermediary cities, and the development of smaller rural habitats with provision of quality services. These options are complementary and they contribute to a more balanced approach of territorial development. The decision of a rural person to migrate should not be dictated by survival or search for a decent life, but inspired by an aspiration for new experiences. For that to happen the first step is a strong commitment in investing in agriculture and rural development and to institute territorial development strategies in order to multiply «safe havens» that offer an attractive life. SSA rural migrants would then migrate by choice, and not by necessity. This future has still to be created through political vision and inter-African cooperation.

Fig.12.1: Global anticipated movements of population due to temperature increase applied to Africa





Fig.12.2: Anticipated geography of migration drivers



**Governance and food deficit**

- Icon: Governance index < 45
- Icon: Governance index > 60
- Icon: Food deficit index > 100
- Icon: Food deficit index < 10

**Climate change anticipated effects**

- Color: Less precipitation
- Color: More precipitation
- Color: Risk of desertification
- Color: Sea level rise threatening cities
- Icon: Negative agricultural changes

**Cities in 2030 (Million inhabitants)**


- Icon: 1
- Icon: 2
- Icon: 5
- Icon: 7
- Icon: 10

**Estimated population density in 2030**

- Color: Very low
- Color: Very high

- Icon: Anticipated orientation of rural migration within SSA

Fig.12.3: Anticipated geography of migration destinations







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## INTRODUCTION

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# Notes

## INTRODUCTION

**Fig. 0.1**

The figure provides results for 32 countries only. 16 countries out of 32 use more than one criterion for their definition of rural areas.

## SPREAD 1

**Fig. 1.2**

In the anamorphic representation adopted for this figure (also named cartogram), the size of countries is proportional to their rural population in 2050. Geographical borders are consequently modified in proportion to the value of the population indicator. Rural population in 2050 is estimated by applying the share of rural population on total population at that date provided by the UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision, to the estimated total population provided by the UNDESA World Population Prospects, 2017 revision (medium fertility variant). The rural population increase 2015-2050 displayed for some countries is calculated after estimation of rural population in 2015 using the same method. Note that the World Urbanization Prospects are based on overtime estimates of the natural urban growth rate and the rural to urban migration rate.

**Fig. 1.3**

The annual cohort is calculated as one-tenth of the 15-to-24 year-old age group estimated in the UNDESA World Population Prospects, 2017 revision (medium fertility variant). It is the flow entering the working age group (15-64). It differs from the change in the working age group's size, which also takes into account people entering the non-working 64+ group. The absolute increase in the 15-64 group is less precise because in SSA- as in other countries without a formal labour market or a generalized pension system - many people continue to work after the age of 64. The 15-to-24 year-old age group includes youth attending school and students. It is assumed that they will start to work or look for a job or an income-generating activity between the ages of 15 and 24, depending on their access to the education system. Taking one-fifth of the 20-to-24 year-old age group instead of one-tenth of the 15-to-24 year-old age group would not significantly change the size of the yearly cohort. Rural and urban cohorts are estimated by applying the shares provided by the UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision.

**Fig. 1.3**

The evolution of rural population is estimated by applying the share of rural population on total population (1950 to 2050) provided by the UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision, to the estimated total population provided by the UNDESA World Population Prospects, 2017 revision (medium fertility variant).

## SPREAD 2

**Fig. 2.1**

The MRHS data used in generating this figure are weighted for all countries but Kenya, because the vector of the sampling weight for this country is not included in the database.

## SPREAD 3

**Fig. 3.1 and 3.3**

The MRHS data used in generating these figures are weighted for all countries but Kenya, because the vector of the sampling weight for this country is not included in the database.

**Fig. 3.3**

The two charts presenting average results per household type were computed using the Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). These surveys are not representative at the national level. The average daily income for each country is standardized into US Dollar equivalents at purchasing power parity (PPP) to allow comparative analysis. The PPP conversion factor cited from the World Development Indicators for year 2013 was applied to income data provided in local currency units (LCU) in the surveys.

## SPREAD 4

**Fig. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4**

The estimates are based on the methodology developed by Ratha and Shaw (2007), "South-South Migration and Remittances", Development Prospects Group, World Bank. Remittance data is for 2014 and is disaggregated using host country and origin country incomes, and estimated migrant stocks from 2013. [source](#).

Fig 4.4 displays the share of remittances sent to Africa, calculated on remittances sent by country in monetary value, equal to or >\$10m.

**Fig. 4.3**

The MRHS data used for this figure are based on weighted sample representative at national level except for South Africa.

## SPREAD 6

**Fig. 6.4**

The rural population share of the Diourbel region is estimated in order to take into account the importance of the agglomeration of Touba. The urban population of the region is estimated first by aggregating the total population of Diourbel commune and Touba agglomeration provided by the 2013 census. The urban population is then deducted from the total population to get the rural population and the rural share calculated.

## SPREAD 7

**Fig. 7.2**

The inter-district lifetime net migration rate (I-O/P) refers to all people who were enumerated in a district different from their district of birth. The in-born population (I) refers to persons whose place of residence at the time of the Census is still in the district where they were born. The out-migrant population (O) refers to persons whose place of residence at the time of the Census is not in district where they were born. The difference between I and O for a given district is divided by the population of that district (P) at the time of enumeration. The limitation of this method is that certain types of migrants, such as temporary migrants, seasonal migrants and return migrants are not identifiable because they are mixed with non-migrant or migrant populations.

## SPREAD 10

Illustrations and text are partly based on a 2009-2010 household survey implemented in Leonzoane, Massinga District, Inhamitanga Province. A stratified sample by quota, selecting households spanning five age groups was used to support the long term analysis. Such a sample allows capturing the broad qualitative evolution of Leonzoane households' migration patterns and livelihood



structures across time, but does not permit quantitative inference. The survey questionnaire adopted the principles of ‘familial, professional and migratory biography surveys’. The professional and migratory trajectories followed by households according to their age groups reflect the characteristics of migration and livelihoods for a specific period. 20-year age groups were defined in order to fit with the three main periods of the local history: the colonial period for the 60+ years age group, the pre- and post-independence period for the 41–60 years age group, and the end and post-war period for the 20–40 years age group. For more information on the detailed methodology, see references: Mercandalli (2015) and (2017).

#### Fig. 10.1

This figure illustrates the diversity of household strategies and related migration trajectories. The main strategies are described in five coloured boxes which display the main combination of activities and the income group for each strategy and the share of households per strategy in the total sample. Only migrant household strategies are presented (70% of the sample). For a detailed presentation of this households livelihood typology see Mercandalli (2015).

The text refers to the 1928 convention. This convention established that “*after a man had worked during 9 months - the initial contract period having been extended to 18 months (...) half of its incomes were retained and transferred to the government of Mozambique at the official exchange rate in order to be handed to the worker by official representatives at his return*” (Diário do Governo, ‘Convenção entre o Governo da República portuguesa e o Governo da União da África do Sul’, 30 November 1928.)

## SPREAD 12

### Fig 12.1

Adapted from the global world maps of mega-patterns driven by global warming developed by Valsson and Ulfarsson (2012).

### Fig 12.2 and 12.3

The calculation of the governance index is based on data extracted for SSA countries from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) database for 2015. Countries are classified in three colour groups according to index values as follows: Green: IIAG>60; White: 45<IIAG<60; Red: IIAG<45. The figures only display green and red indexes. [source](#)

The food deficit index is based on data extracted from the FAO Food Security Indicators (SOFI 2015). The food deficit index is the product of the average value of “the prevalence of undernourishment” multiplied by “the depth of food deficit” over the 2002–2015 period. As per FAO definitions, prevalence of undernourishment is the probability that a randomly selected individual from the population consumes an amount of calories that is insufficient to cover her/his energy requirement for an active and healthy life, and depth of food deficit is the amount of calories that would be needed to lift the undernourished from their status, everything else being constant. The food deficit index used in the maps displays therefore simultaneously the intensity and the distribution of the food deficit at country level. Only countries with a food deficit index below 10 (green symbol) and over 100 (red symbol) are represented.

The data related to the projected size of the cities was acquired from UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision using the zero-migration variant. Cities with population under 1 million inhabitants in 2030 are not represented.

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# Rural Africa in motion

Dynamics and drivers of migration South of the Sahara

*Sub-Saharan Africa has a long history of internal and international migratory movements. Migration patterns and dynamics from, to and between rural areas are profoundly differentiated across regions, and flows have considerably evolved over time. Yet, more recently, rural migration takes place in the unique situation of a major rural and urban demographic increase, which results in critical socio-economic and environmental challenges. In this context, intertwined migration drivers emerge and call for a better understanding of on-going dynamics.*

*This atlas offers a comprehensive analysis of the existing migration patterns as well as the diverse and multifaceted factors that impact on migration practices. It highlights the complexity of drivers at play and explains how mobility can be a strategic response to a rapidly changing environment. New rural livelihoods are contributing to intensifying rural-urban linkages and are part of the reshaping of regional dynamics and territorial development. Supporting these new dynamics with adequate public policies and multi-stakeholder strategies is of critical importance for the future of the continent.*

